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Alteration in Lived Experience 
Abstract 
The definition of delusion is usually couched in terms of false beliefs held with conviction 
despite evidence to the contrary.  Such beliefs are usually seen as impossible or implausible 
by others.  In order to be classed as clinically significant, a delusion would lead a person to be 
distressed or to have significant problems with functioning. We note that a person ordinarily 
understands and negotiates the world based on familiar patterns derived from her cultural and 
historical experience. Thus, when her lived experience is altered, these assumptions about 
how the world works may be called in to question. Drawing on interviews conducted with 
people experiencing clinically significant delusions, we show how this alteration in lived 
experience manifests as emotional, affective and/or perceptual anomalies. We adopt the 
framework of the Enactive Approach which posits that a person interacts with her 
environment in terms of sense-making and we argue that radical alterations in lived 
experience can demand a renegotiating of how a person makes sense of this new world. We 
suggest that if the alteration in lived experience is sufficiently radical, then delusion formation 
is inevitable. 
Keywords: Delusion, Affective, Emotional, Perceptual, Enactive Approach 
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1. Introduction 
People negotiate the world based on their experience of how their world works.  A 
person is born into a family, the family consists of particular relationships and the 
family lives within a relatively circumscribed culture. A person might encounter or 
engage with other cultures or sub-cultures as she develops and finds her place in the 
world.  Humans are flexible and adaptive. The difference between the lived 
experience of a hunter-gatherer in the Amazon Rainforest and an investment banker in 
the City of London highlights this flexibility.  However, we can also imagine that 
there might be circumstances under which an alteration in a person’s lived experience 
would be so radical that rapid adjustment is not possible (Parnas & Handest, 2003). 
Faced with an unrecognisable world, a person might feel unable to cope with her lived 
experience. This might lead to despair, depression or even suicide. A person might 
require a new explanation of how the world works, in order to survive it.  
In this paper, we draw upon some original research conducted with people who have 
experienced clinically significant delusions, in order to reflect upon these phenomena. 
We will argue that, in our participants’ narrative accounts, a radical alteration in lived 
experience follows a trajectory that leads, via intense affective, perceptual and/or 
emotional experiences, to the forming of new explanations about the world. These 
new explanations may be difficult for others to comprehend, but they are not 
necessarily without meaning or internal coherence.  Although it may seem to be a 
bold claim, the notion that we are sense-making beings embedded in environments 
over which we may have no control opens the possibility that any of us might need a 
delusional explanation to make sense of a radically altered world.  That is not to say 
we imagine that all people would respond in the same way in extremis – simply that 
the (unique and complex) experiences each of us has gives us a (unique) ‘breaking 
point.’   We expand on the framework for this complexity further in what follows. 
1.1 Delusions and the Enactive Approach 
Many factors are implicated in shaping the development of human psychology.  So 
when things go wrong and someone becomes mentally ill, there are many factors that 
might contribute to this (see Bentall, 2016 for an extensive list of candidates). People 
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are dynamic and complex, and in most cases, so are the factors that causally 
contribute to their psychological distress. 
The enactive approach posits that a vast array of factors (biological, psychological 
and environmental) are intermeshed to create a ‘person-environment system’. This 
term invites us to notice that a person is not a discrete object; persons are comprised 
of bodies, stories, concepts, origins, commitments, connections, affordances - and so 
on - and are constantly reacting with their environment.  Cognition emerges from the 
complex mereology of these many components.  According to the enactive approach, 
a mind does not exist in isolation from a person or the world that the person inhabits.  
In the enactive approach, the mereology of the cognising (person-environment) 
system supposes that the parts (which include relational and environmental parts as 
well as bodily (person-level) parts) are arranged in a particular way, and that the 
relationship of the parts to each other is vital for the function of the whole.  The 
function of the whole co-constitutive system is a property of the parts being arranged 
in this particular way.  The enactive approach sees the person as primarily a sense-
making being and, as such, her primary goal is to make sense of her experience 
understood in terms of any situation or environment in which she finds herself 
(Varela, Rosch, & Thompson, 1991).  
1.2 Aims of this Paper 
A person has desires and needs in relation to survival and procreation - and these all 
have affective components.  A person cares about herself and how her needs are met.  
She makes decisions about action in the world based on her response to positively-
valenced preferences and negatively-valenced objects, or situations to be avoided.  
The person’s response is first bodily and then cognitive.  A human being is (perhaps 
uniquely) able to respond to her situation at a number of different ‘levels’.  These 
levels might be described as somatic (or bodily), cognitive and meta-cognitive.  For 
example a person might see a bear coming towards her and start to run away as a 
direct result of a somatic fear response (with no self-conscious thought about it at all). 
Alternatively, she might have a similar fear response but recognise it as such (through 
self-conscious cognition), and so weigh up the options and decide instead to hide 
rather than run. She might see a bear in a film, or safely contained at the zoo, and yet 
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still experience a strong fear response, leading her to recognise that she has a fear of 
bears, and realise that this response is irrational (at a meta-cognitive level, through 
thinking about her thinking) and decide to do nothing.  This affective content helps us 
to make sense of the world, and to identify those things which are experienced as 
positively and negatively valenced.  In this paper, we will show and argue that a 
serious disruption in affective experience, arising from a person-environment system, 
may have an important role in the formation of delusions. 
In section 2, we outline the methodology used for the empirical research, in section 3 
we analyse the research findings and in section 4 we briefly discuss models of 
delusion, the implications of our findings and make some concluding remarks. 
2. Method 
2.1 Approach 
The first author planned to interview, record and transcribe the experiences of people 
with active delusions, and then to analyse the transcripts using Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  IPA has its origins in phenomenology and as such 
fits with an attempt to capture the nature of an experience for a given person in a 
given context.  Smith and colleagues use Heidegger’s notion of appearing and liken 
interpretation to a kind of detective work where the researcher is mining the material 
for possible meanings, thus allowing the phenomenon of interest to shine forth 
(Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 35).  The double hermeneutic means that the 
researcher is always trying to make sense of the participant, who is in turn trying to 
make sense of what is happening in the context of her lifeworld as an embodied, 
situated person.  As such, IPA is compatible with the enactive approach to cognition 
(Larkin, Eatough, & Osborn, 2011). Using the double hermeneutic encourages a 
both/and approach on the part of the researcher: on the one hand to assume an 
empathic stance and imagine what it is like to be the participant and, at the same time, 
to be critical and probing in ways in which participants might be unwilling or unable 
to engage with themselves.  IPA thus aims to produce rich experiential understandings 
of the phenomenon under investigation whilst remaining close to the participant’s 
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sense-making as well as developing a narrative of other possible meanings (Eatough 
& Smith, 2008).  This is in contrast to other qualitative methods such as ethnography, 
thematic analysis and grounded theory which do not specifically employ the double 
hermeneutic in this way (Howitt, 2016). 
2.2 Ethical review  
A detailed research protocol1 was written and submitted via the Integrated Research 
Application System (IRAS) for National Health Service (NHS) Ethical approval and 
for NHS Research and Development (R&D) approval.  The protocol was approved by 
the ethics committee and was approved by local (participating) NHS trusts. 
2.3 Sampling 
IPA requires in-depth data from relatively small samples of participants, due to its 
commitment to idiographic detail, and its sensitivity to context. 
Our participants were sought via collaboration with local NHS mental health 
departments.  Participants meeting the following criteria were interviewed: 
• service users within local NHS mental health services  
• having active delusion(s) 
• able to give informed consent to participate in the study 
• able to talk about their experiences 
• at minimal risk (of distress) when talking about their experiences 
• able to speak English (no translator is provided) 
• willing to travel to a suitable NHS location to participate in the interviews  
Four participants agreed to take part, and each was interviewed twice. 
                                            
1 IRAS research protocol number 167001 
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2.4 Data collection 
The first author conducted the interviews. Each participant was interviewed for 
approximately one hour on both occasions, using a semi-structured topic guide.  In the 
first interview, the participants were asked about their history and the onset of their 
problems.  In the second interview, participants were asked what their experience was 
like at the time of being interviewed.  The focus was on what was important to the 
participant. The interviews were recorded, anonymised and transcribed.  
2.5 Data analysis 
Data analysis (analysis of each research participant’s narrative) was undertaken using 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  Narrative provides an important 
basis for the analysis of qualitative data and, whether we ask them to or not, 
participants in qualitative research interviews often shape their accounts as stories.   
Stories are not distractions from important information about experiences. Stories 
themselves are important information (Stephens & Breheny, 2013). 
IPA aims to understand what experience means to an individual, and also to identify 
themes across different people’s experience. We wished to understand both the 
experience of the delusion and the meaning it held, as well as the context (in narrative 
terms) in which the delusion arose.   
Using IPA, the transcripts were analysed recursively for each participant, and then 
across the different participants. Analysis in IPA follows a set of key principles 
(Smith et al., 2009), which are often implemented via a set of common processes: 
repeated listening, repeated reading of transcripts, reflection, detailed annotation and 
coding, clustering of themes, checking interpretations, re-checking and seeking 
credibility with a third party. We followed these generic processes, with the first 
author conducting the preliminary coding for experiential content (see Larkin & 
Thompson, 2011 for coding strategies) and the second author providing reflection and 
credibility checking on the developing interpretations.  IPA’s processes are designed 
to ensure that interpretative claims are grounded in the data, rather than the 
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researcher’s biases and assumptions, and to produce an analytic account which is both 
meaningful and credible (Smith et al., 2009). 
3. Research Findings 
In the spirit of IPA’s idiographic commitments, we begin by briefly describing the 
ordinary lived experience of each research participant, prior to the radical changes in 
their lived experiences in order to establish the context of our participants’ accounts 
(section 3.1). We then present a more interpretative account in section 3.2. 
3.1 Context 
This qualitative research relies on the participant to tell his or her story in whatever 
way he or she chooses.  An assumption that a person has told us what they deem to be 
significant is made here.  Details about their lives before the onset of their delusions 
are limited, but it is possible to begin to understand what was important and 
meaningful to them and what they expected from life. 
One of the research participants, Barbara, was married to a man who was a serial 
adulterer.  He had already left or threatened to leave her on a number of occasions for 
other women. She had been desperate for him to stay with her and he had done so 
each time.  Her marriage was extremely important to her and she had made decisions 
against her better judgement at her husband’s behest in order to prevent him from 
leaving. 
Another participant, Andrew, joined a ‘job for life’ workplace at a young age.  He was 
the office junior and was required to respond to the demands of a number of different 
people.  He was perhaps naïve and had little experience of relationships outside the 
family.  He said a number of times while recounting his experiences, ‘I didn’t know 
how the world worked.’  He bought a flat at the age of 21 and moved out from the 
parental home to live on his own.  Shortly afterwards his father became ill and his 
mother became his father’s carer.  Andrew, who was very close to his parents, said he 
was ‘left alone to my own devices.’  He was focussed upon work and had a strong 
desire to do well. 
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Alison, our third research participant, had two young children when her husband died 
by suicide.  She worked as a legal secretary and had a keen interest in the law.  She 
subsequently re-married and had two more children with her new husband. She 
continued to work because she enjoyed her job and she wanted to help support the 
family financially.  She retired after working for over thirty years.  Despite having 
some problems with her neighbours, she looked after some of them, and was involved 
with her community.  
Caroline grew up in a family where she was required to do what her sister said or else 
she was punished.  If she showed she was upset, her father would punish her. When 
she complained to her parents about her sister’s behaviour they said they could not 
help her, because it was ‘only your word against your sister’s’ (her sister was very 
careful not to get caught).  Caroline started a relationship with a woman when she was 
in her teens and some time later they moved in to a house together.  Caroline said that 
the relationship was good to start with.  Caroline had a good job that she liked and 
was also training to qualify for a better job in her chosen field.   
In the next section, we describe the ways in which their lived experiences were 
altered. 
3.2 Injustice, Unfairness and a Radical Alteration in Lived Experience 
3.2.1 Barbara 
When Barbara’s husband finally left her, she became extremely depressed: 
I was really depressed, really down, really miserable.  So I prayed as you do… I just 
want this pain to go away.  So… um… I’d already been through a bad time, took an 
overdose, everything and then all of a sudden… I felt better after I’d prayed. (Barbara 
1, 1:9-15)   
Barbara prays for resolution and for the pain to go away. The breakdown of her 
marriage represented a significant alteration in Barbara’s lived experience. Her 
marriage gave her meaning and, although her husband was unreliable he had always 
returned to her in the past thus affording a form of stability.  Guilt about the previous 
decisions she had made - which she had justified in order to keep her husband - 
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subsequently came to the surface.  Barbara experienced the injustice of this situation: 
she had compromised her principles to keep her husband, and then he had left her 
anyway. 
I’d feel really really guilty, the guilt would like…  eat you up like you’ve done 
murder or something.  It was…  it felt really really guilty.” (Barbara 1, 3:36-38) 
Two weeks later, she suddenly felt better. Her depression and mental anguish 
disappeared and she was enjoying life. Around this time, Barbara started to get the 
sense that she was being watched and that songs on the radio were presenting 
important messages to her.  She did not seem distressed, worried or puzzled although 
she did think it was ‘weird’ and found it difficult to explain. She assumed there was 
an explanation; she just needed to work out what the explanation was. Then Barbara 
started seeing messages in the environment, for example, through road signs. Her 
attention was drawn to particular words. The amalgamation of these words gave her 
new messages.  Again, she found this very difficult to explain. This is a common 
feature prior to delusion formation (Kapur, 2003).   
It is unclear exactly when it started to happen, but at some point she experienced God 
replying to her questions and prayers.  She said that God was talking to her directly 
‘by telepathy.’  Barbara became overwhelmed by fear and guilt and the need to atone.  
She began to deny herself food and tried to give up smoking.  Eventually she 
developed an elaborate schema where she was God’s daughter and therefore did not 
have mortal needs (e.g. food), all other people were devils and were doomed to mortal 
lives, she could talk to God any time she wanted and he would talk back to her, God 
loved her unconditionally and forgave her all her sins, and she would live forever in 
Heaven: 
He wouldn’t let me do…  he wouldn’t let me do anything that would damage me… 
something that I wouldn’t be able to live with. (Barbara 2) 
I know I’m safe wherever I go. (Barbara 2) 
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Barbara’s new world-view enabled her to feel that she was loved and lovable, that she 
was intelligent, beautiful, important and was forgiven for past actions.  This enabled 
her to make new meaning in this new world.   
3.2.2 Andrew 
Andrew described his workplace as a ‘hellhole’.  He found it very difficult to talk 
about this, resorting to analogy and generalisation: 
It’s that awful.  You’ve seen the original ‘Planet of the Apes’… film, 1964 I think it is 
with Charlton Heston… and you know how he’s treated during it?2  Management treat 
you the… similar to that.  That’s how it felt. (Andrew 1) 
He was utterly powerless in this situation.  His whole idea of what the workplace 
should be like and how people should be treated is brought into question.  He sounded 
contemptuous when he said: 
So when… managers have more power than the worker they misuse it.  It’s human 
nature.  Absolute power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.  If you give 
people too much power they’ll misuse it. (Andrew 1) 
Andrew developed obsessional thoughts, checking behaviours, mild paranoia, had 
trouble sleeping and became addicted to sleeping tablets.  He eventually sought help 
and was diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).  
Andrew’s new life represented a radical alteration in his lived experience.  Prior to 
this he lived with his parents and enjoyed a relatively stress free life.  He found that he 
was unable to negotiate relationships at work and felt huge anxiety in this regard. He   
became stressed and fearful.  We assume he had not experienced injustice before; he 
found what he witnessed at work to be intolerable.  Once the OCD took hold, he felt 
utter despair and ‘torture.’ 
                                            
2 In the film ‘Planet of the Apes’ human beings are treated like animals, used for slave labour, 
kept in cages and experiments are done on them. 
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Andrew says he was taken over by God, wrote an email where he committed to 
righting some global wrongs, sent it to a large mailing list, called the police and called 
an ambulance.  He said that God spoke to him: 
…you need to take a massive leap of faith.  Trust in me. Trust in God and send this e-
mail.  You are the only person who can do it… And I literally wrote… everything… 
that it felt I was commanded to by God. (Andrew 2) 
Andrew’s delusion, that he was God’s messenger and could mete out God’s justice, 
allowed him to believe that God always had a plan for him.  This gave meaning to the 
‘torture’ that he had suffered and enabled resolution of the tension he felt about not 
being able to fully explain, understand or negotiate the world: 
…even whilst all the suffering I’d been through, like during it, I’d always thought that 
this was potentially God’s plan.  For me. (Andrew 2) 
This might help to restore his previously held ideas about the world being just.  If 
there is no justice or fairness in the workplace, there is justice through God.  Andrew, 
as God’s messenger could commit to participating in making sure that justice was 
done by ‘doing all that is necessary.’3   
3.2.3 Alison 
Alison moved away from her anti-social neighbours and went to live near a family 
member.  This relative was then falsely accused of sexually abusing his step-daughter.  
Alison attended court every day.  She became stressed and started to have difficulty 
sleeping.  He was found guilty of the crime and subsequently jailed.  She described it 
as follows, and was clearly disdainful of the decision: 
It was split…. and the judge said well I’m locking you up for the weekend… unless 
you can come back quickly with a ten two. So they did. And he was found guilty.  He 
did from the May til Christmas and obviously he’s got ten years now because you have 
ten years put on don’t you, at home. He’s done three years. But he didn’t do it. (Alison 
1)   
                                            
3 This is a quote from the film ‘Batman Returns’ - Andrew uses this quote a number of times 
and uses other ‘hero’ film analogies throughout the interviews. 
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This constituted a radical alteration in Alison’s lived experience.  She previously had 
positive experiences with the law and the police (due to her job as a legal secretary 
and from personal experience) and she had faith in the police and the judicial system.  
She was horrified that, on this occasion, when her family member was relying on the 
law to prove that he was innocent the system has failed.  She found this injustice 
difficult to understand. 
Alison’s world altered as the injustices accrued.  She was falsely accused of crimes 
and reported to the police by a neighbour when she moved back to her home town.  
The harassment from her neighbour was so distressing that she decided to move 
house.  Around this time she also found out she had a life-threatening heart condition.  
It is unclear exactly when this happened, but at some point Alison started to think that 
the neighbour, the local council and the police were working together to prove that 
she was guilty of something.  The methods she described seemed implausible.  When 
she moved house she found out that the old neighbour was friends with the new one.  
After this Alison went to bed and stayed there for four months only getting up to go to 
doctor’s appointments and to see family. 
Eventually she said she could hear other people having conversations (when those 
people were not present).  She also said she could hear people who were present but 
who did not look like they were talking and could communicate with others without 
saying anything.  She had difficulty explaining this and, at times, was adamant that 
this was happening and at other times she questioned the experience and wondered if 
it was ‘all in her head’: 
I got the voices in my head… um… I felt that I could talk to people without moving my 
mouth, I could hear long distance conversations, but yeah sometimes I still do.  And 
sometimes I walk past people and I feel as though I know what they’re thinking. 
(Alison 1, 3:46-49) 
Well, no, that is true.  I could hear people’s thoughts.  And I used to go like this as I 
passed them [puts her fingers in her ears]. (Alison 2, 5:4-5)   
If she was mis-identifying her own thoughts, fears, wishes and imaginings as external 
in some sense (either ‘voiced’ out loud or ‘picked up’ through telepathy) she required 
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an explanation.  If she thought these thoughts and voices were not her then she looked 
to the environment for an explanation.  Those who were around her, such as 
neighbours and visiting police, seemed likely candidates.  If she could pick up the 
thoughts of others then perhaps they could pick up her thoughts.  This seemed to her 
to be true as what she experienced seemed like a conversation (using telepathy).  
Alison’s new world incorporated these experiences.  She did not need to worry about 
‘going mad’ because she was telepathic.  In this way she was able to have ‘long 
distance conversations’ with police and council officials in order to tell them her side 
of the story. 
3.2.4 Caroline 
Caroline’s relationship, which started off well, began to break down.  Her partner 
became verbally and physically aggressive.  With hindsight Caroline could see that 
she was unable to acknowledge her own emotions or express them in a 
straightforward way.  She was unaware of this at the time and she just put up with it 
while it got worse.  She assumed that this abuse was ‘normal’ because she had 
experienced it from her sister and her father: 
I never realised at the time I was in an abusive relationship… both mentally and 
physically…. Some people do it and some people don’t and it was just normal to have 
people out there that did do them things…” (Caroline 1) 
Her ability to negotiate the world became radically altered.  She was used to being 
able to shut off her emotions and put up with anything.  She now found she could no 
longer do this.  She got physical symptoms and eventually had full blown panic 
attacks that she did not understand.  She took a number of overdoses and ended up at 
the Accident and Emergency (A&E) department of her local hospital.  She could not 
say, at the time, why she was doing this.  Her experience of herself as a robust person 
who could just get on with life was completely shattered.  Caroline had, perhaps, 
experienced injustice all her life but because this was normalised she had developed 
coping strategies.  She was re-assaulted by the injustice in her new relationship and 
found that her coping strategies no longer worked. 
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Caroline developed a number of ‘voices.’  She described looking around for where the 
voices were coming from on some occasions, thinking there were speakers behind her 
somewhere, thinking there was a chip in her arm (put in by the government) and 
puzzling over how she was hearing what she was hearing.  At the same time she also 
seemed to think it was normal in some sense.   
She did not question the commanding nature of the voices.  She simply incorporated 
them into her world as real, and felt compelled to do what they commanded.  
Sometimes she would resist, but the voice would persist and the threat would increase 
until she did what she was told.  There are obvious parallels between this and her 
sister’s behaviour (‘do this or I’ll hit you’), her father’s behaviour (‘don’t get upset or 
I’ll give you something to really be upset about’) and her partner’s abusive behaviour.  
This behaviour drew attention to her plight and mental health services became 
involved. 
4. Implications / discussion 
4.1 Perceptual, Affective and Emotional Anomalies and a Radical Alteration in 
Lived Experience. 
Barbara experienced being drawn towards things in the environment such as music on 
the radio, road signs and things that people were saying.  Other things in the 
environment, such as certain people and places, repelled her and she had the sensation 
that she was being watched.  Barbara felt despair about her husband leaving, guilt 
over past decisions and intense joy/love, fear and anger.  At times these emotions felt 
objectless and they became attached to other experiences. Barbara needed an 
explanation for how she now experienced the world. 
Alison found that she could ‘hear’ long distance conversations, read the minds of 
others and converse with people ‘telepathically.’ She at first found this peculiar and 
thought she might be ill.  As this experience persisted she came to accept that 
something was happening to her that required explanation. 
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Caroline was traumatised from an early age. Strong bodily feelings (such as panic) 
and a compulsion to behave in ways that she did not understand (e.g. taking 
overdoses) became part of Caroline’s new world.  She could not understand what was 
happening and sought an explanation. 
Andrew was immersed in an unjust and frightening environment.  He developed OCD 
and became obsessed with worrying about work and a training course he was doing.  
He then became overwhelmed by an inexplicable power and was compelled to write 
and send an email.  He sought an explanation in order to make sense of his 
experiences. 
All the research participants have experienced a radical alteration in lived experience 
characterised by affective, perceptual and emotional anomalies. These anomalies 
inform their lived experience and, as we are sense-making beings, demand an 
explanation.  In each case the attempt at sense-making turns out to be delusional. 
In what follows we look at models of delusions and how our findings might best be 
conceptualised. 
4.2. Some Models of Delusion  
Garety and Freeman’s (2013) review of around 250 research papers on delusions 
suggests that stress, anxiety, worry and other emotions might be significant factors 
with regard to delusion formation and highlights the presence of perceptual or 
affective anomalies prior to the onset of delusion.  They further suggest that it is 
important to conduct research to understand the factors that might be at play in 
relation to delusion formation and maintenance. They recognise the heterogeneity of 
delusions and questions the validity of diagnostic categories with regard to research 
and treatment, concluding that:  
…the focus should be on understanding and treating the individual experiences that the 
patient is reporting, with the aim of reducing the distress and impact of each.  In the 
clinic the experiences of the patient – rather than diagnosis – should be placed centre 
stage. (ibid) 
Page 17 of 22 
One assumption which underpins many psychological approaches to delusional 
beliefs is that delusions are formed as a result of understandable, but erroneous, 
interpretation. Across a range of conventional cognitive models, this error may be 
made due to biases arising from previous experiences, or deficits (e.g. in reality 
testing) arising from other aspects of psychotic syndromes (Barch, 2004).  In 
Bayesian cognitive models, the error arises from a mismatch between the brain’s 
predictions and subsequent perceptual information (Sterzer et al., 2018). At a 
conceptual level, these are not hugely dissimilar.   
In contrast, the Enactive Approach offers us a different view.  To be clear, we do not 
intend to claim that the enactive approach tells us exactly how or why a particular 
individual develops a delusion.  Rather, the enactive approach gives a general 
framework that captures the complexity of individual experience, in the context of 
sense-making, and within a person-environment system.  The Enactive view contains 
the idea that the ‘error’ of a delusional belief is understandable in terms of sense-
making within the complex mereology entailed through understanding cognition as an 
emergent property of a person-environment system.  This means that the experience 
must be understood at the level of individual phenomenology in order to grasp the 
nature of the delusion.  From a clinical perspective, we must therefore take seriously 
the environment in which a person finds herself as constitutive of delusion formation.  
This difference in emphasis arises because the notion that a person is both embodied 
and embedded in the world is central to the Enactivist’s conceptualisation of 
cognition (see Larkin, Eatough & Osborn, 2011). A person cannot exist without a 
body.  A person does not exist outside of, or separate from the environment in which 
she lives.  She is embedded in the world in which she finds herself.  Cognition is a 
property of the embodied embedded person and as such is subject to the complex 
mereology entailed in such a system (Varela et al., 1991).  If mental activity is an 
emergent property of lived experience, then the biological, psychological and 
environmental are constitutive of cognition - and therefore they are also constitutive of 
phenomena such as delusions. 
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4.3 Limitations 
The category of ‘radical alteration’ is open and contains the kinds of alterations which 
are described by our participants in this study.  We acknowledge that there is tension 
between describing participants' accounts and interpreting their meaning.  In 
qualitative analysis, it is conventional for interpretative themes to be developed and 
conceptualised in the inductive manner which we have employed here, but this does 
not rule out the possibility of alternate interpretations.  As a consequence, our claim is 
a deliberately cautious one relating to these four cases, and we hope that further work 
will be conducted to elaborate on the contents and boundaries of this category.   
 
We have described the four cases in terms of sense-making and the enactive 
approach.  Interpretation is a cornerstone of IPA and our overarching argument (that 
people are sense making beings who always strive to make sense of their world) is 
compatible with the Enactive Approach and with the data.   There are, of course, other 
theoretical frameworks (including social constructivist, Kantian  and many other 
approaches – see, for example, Georgaca, 2004; Radden, 2011; Kiran & Chaudhury, 
2009), but we have focused on the Enactive Approach for our argument because it 
seems to us to offer a particularly salient and helpful way of thinking about these data. 




If delusions are understood as heterogeneous and as emerging from an understandable 
re-evaluation arising from a radical alteration in lived experience in the context of 
affective, emotional and perceptual anomalies, this demands an attempt to understand 
the totality of a person’s experience.  A person strives for sense-making in whatever 
environment she finds herself.  From a clinical perspective, this demands an attempt 
to understand the phenomenology of the experience.  There is a wide literature on the 
nature of stigma in mental illness (see for example Canadian Health Services 
Research Foundation, 2013; Mehta & Farina, 1997) and framing delusion formation 
in this way helps us to reduce stigma: how can a person who is doing her best to make 
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sense of her world be ‘at fault’ or ‘bad’?  It also helps us to take seriously the impact 
of environmental and affective factors: delusions are not simply ‘faulty’ or ‘biased’ 
thought processes.   We can then recognise the complexity of the systems within 
which delusions arise.  The complexity and individuality of human experience 
understood in terms of sense-making for each unique individual means that we move 
away from generalisations about how delusions are formed.  
 
In this context the focus of treatment might then be directed towards affective, 
perceptual and emotional aspects of a person’s lived experience as well as 
environmental and relational factors.  To think of delusion simply in terms of ‘false 
beliefs’ which are ‘firmly sustained despite… obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary…’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 819) is to limit them to 
cognitive anomalies, over-simplify the experience and deny the meaning an 
experience might hold for a given individual.  
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